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RESHELVING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: BOA4RD OF
EDUCWTION, ISLAND TREES UNION FREE
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 26 v. PICO
Perhaps no single event has more evocative power to signal
the suppression of free speech than the burning of a book.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The silence of the Constitution on the subject of education, coupled with the language of the tenth amendment, 2 has given states extensive power to establish systems for public school administration.' This
authority is often expressed in the form of statutory enactments which
require local school boards to prescribe appropriate educational materials for students in their districts.' With few exceptions, the judiciary
has been reluctant to intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise
in the daily operation of school systems5 and has afforded broad deference to the discretion and judgment of school officials.6 Such judgments are not, however, sacrosanct and, with increasing frequency,
federal courts have intervened to review the actions of educators which
"directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 7
Recent challenges to school officials' autonomy have involved the
selective removal of library books.8 At issue has been the extent to
1. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404,
432 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), aft'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
2. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
3. Project, Education and the Law. State Interests and IndividualRights, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 1373, 1375-76 n.4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Project]. See also Stallings,LegalFactors
Pertainingto School BoardMembership in MunicipalitiesOver 100,000 Population, in LEGAL
ISSUES IN EDUCATION 283, 284 (Edward Claude Bolmeier ed. 1970).

4. See generally Project, supra note 3, at 1375.
5. See, e.g., East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 857 (2d Cir.
1977) (en banc) (on petition for rehearing).
6. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404, 425 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Although it is true that the responsibility for public education lies primarily with the states, like all state power it must be exercised consistently with the federal Constitution. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958); see
also Morgan v. McDonough, 548 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1977). Moreover, the Supreme Court
has stressed that the "protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
8. See, e.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd.of Directors, 638 F.2d 438
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which local authorities can restrict the flow of information to the school

community without infringing upon the first amendment rights of students and faculty.9 Contradictory federal court decisions have reflected

the judiciary's uncertainty regarding the extent of constitutional protection afforded students and the limitations to be imposed on local school

board authority. 10
In 1980, the Second Circuit held that while public school officials
have the authority to remove books from district libraries under certain
circumstances, the "unusual and irregular intervention in the school

libraries' operations by persons not routinely concerned with such matters" establishes a prima facie constitutional violation warranting judicial intervention. 1 In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School DistrictNo. 26 v. Pico ,2 (Pico) one of the most deeply divided

decisions in the Burger Court's history, 3 the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision.

4

In so doing, a plurality

of the Court recognized for the first time a distinct constitutional right
to receive information within a school forum. 5
This Note examines the impact of the Supreme Court's holding in
(2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980);
Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd.
No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Sheck v.Baileyville School
Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269
(D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass.
1978).
9. See Comment, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 1092, 1113 (1980). See also Note, State Indoctrinationand the Protection of Non-State
Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibitionof School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 497, 501 (1983) (students' first amendment interests and the schools' indoctrinative
interests need not be analyzed as distinct).
10. See supra note 8. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982),
has done little to alleviate this confusion. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
11. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404,
414-15 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
13. Justice Brennan authored the opinion in which Justices Marshall and Stevens joined.
Justice Blackmun, writing separately, concurred in part while expressing a different interpretation of the first amendment. Justice White concurred in the judgment but expressed no
opinion on the constitutional rights at issue in the case. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor each wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
14. 457 U.S. at 875.
15. Id. at 866-68. Justice White, while concurring in the judgment, was concerned with
the adjudication of a constitutional question when no trial record was developed in the
district court. Id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring). While it is unusual that the Court chose
to grant certiorari in Pico, it is by no means unique. The Court has on numerous occasions
reviewed questions of law in cases where the district court had granted summary judgment.
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Pico by analyzing the heightened standard of review employed by the
Court, and its recognition of a student's first amendment right to receive ideas. It describes the test set forth for determining a constitutional violation based on improper motivation and suggests that it may
serve as a successful blueprint for censorship. This Note also discusses
the effect Pico may be expected to have on future book removal cases.
It concludes that not only is the constitutional entitlement addressed in
Pico narrowly defined by the plurality, but the fragmented nature of
the decision necessitates future clarification of the right at issue.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Facts

In September, 1975, three members of the Island Trees Union
Free School District Board (the Board) attended a conference sponsored by Parents of New York United (PONYU), a politically conservative organization. 6 During the conference, the board members
acquired a list of books which PONYU members considered objectionable, improper, and ill-suited for use in public schools." The school
board's president and vice-president subsequently directed a search of
the district's libraries and card catalogs. They discovered that the district libraries owned ten books which were on the PONYU list. 8
It was not until February 1976, however, at a closed board meeting
attended only by the board members, the principals of the junior and
senior high schools and the district superintendent, that the Board ordered the removal of these books.19 Shortly thereafter, the books were
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).

16. Pico, 457 U.S. at 856.
17. Id. at 857. In a press release issued by the Board these books were
"'anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy ....
Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F.
(E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
18. Pico, 457 U.S. at 856. These books were: SlaughterhouseFive, by

characterized as
""Id. (quoting
Supp. 387, 390
Kurt Vonnegut,

Jr.; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Best

Short Storiesby Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice, by an anonymous
author, Laughing Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; 4 Hero Ain't
Nothin' But a Sandwich, by Alice Childress; Soul on Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver, A Readerfor

Writers, edited by Jerome Archer. Id. at 856-57 n.3.
19. Id. at 856-57. On March 19, 1976, the Board issued a press release which stated that
"[wihile ... these books have a place on the shelves of the public library, [they] DO NOT
belong in school libraries." Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist.,
474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The Board concluded that it had a duty to remove
the books to "protect [students] from ... moral danger." Id.
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removed from the libraries pending future Board action.2 0 This
prompted the issuance of a memorandum from the superintendent of

the school district to the Board expressing disagreement with the
Board's actions.2 He urged that the Board follow existing policy
which was "designed expressly to handle such problems" and recommended the appointment of a book review committee to help resolve
the issue.2 2
Later that month, acting on the superintendent's memorandum

and motivated by public pressure, 23 the Board directed that a committee of eight review the removed books and make recommendations
concerning their usefulness, relevance, and general educational suitability.24 On July 1, 1976, the committee recommended that four books
be reshelved, 25 two be removed, 26 and reached no agreement on the
remaining books. 27 Without explanation, the Board substantially re-

jected the committee's report.28
In response, several Island Trees high school students brought suit
20. Pico, 457 U.S. at 857.
21. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404,
409 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. Id. The book removal policy required that notification be given to the superintendent and a committee be appointed to study the objectionable books and make recommendations. Id. Past court actions indicate the importance of an established policy concerning
selection and removal of reading materials. In cases where a procedure was established and
followed, the courts have refused to question the decisions reached, unless there was a clear
showing of arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of those conducting the proceedings. E.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438, 441 (2d
Cir. 1980) (book removal upheld despite Board's refusal to adopt book committee's recommendation when evidence indicated compliance with established book removal policy). But
see Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 580-81 (6th Cir. 1976) (application of established book removal procedure may still run afoul of first amendment). Even
Justice Brennan admitted that Pico "would be a very different case if the record demonstrated that petitioners had employed established, regular, and facially unbiased procedures
for the review of controversial materials." 457 U.S. at 874.
23. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404,
409 (2d Cir. 1980). As the superintendent predicted, soon after numerous articles appeared
in the New York press regarding the censorship activity, the Island Trees community demanded an explanation for the Board's action. Id.
24. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 391
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
25. Id. These books were LaughingBoy, Black Boy, Go Ask Alice, and Best Short Stories by Negro Writers.
26. Id. These books were The Naked Ape and Down These Mean Streets.
27. Id. These titles included Soul on Ice, 4 Hero Ain't Nothin' but a Sandwich,
SlaughterhouseFive, and A Readerfor Writers.
28. Pico, 457 U.S. at 858. The Board decided that Laughing Boy should be reshelved,
that Black Boy should be available subject to parental approval, but that the remaining
books should be permanently banned. Id. at 858 nn.10-11.
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in state court, asserting that the Board's actions deprived them of their
first amendment rights.2 9 The students argued that the books were removed because they offended the board members' social, political, and
moral tastes. 30 The Board removed the action to federal district court
where its motion for summary judgment was granted. 3 ' The court
found that the Board's decision was motivated by its belief that the
books were educationally unsuitable. The Board's actions did not,
therefore, constitute a constitutional violation. 32 An appeal was subsequently taken to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
B.

The Second Circuit'sReasoning

In P co v. Boardof Education, IslandTrees Union Free School District No. 26, 33 the Second Circuit agreed that the Board had the authority to remove books from district libraries 34 and acknowledged that
mere allegations that controversial books were removed from the library to prohibit expression of ideas would not constitute a first
29. Id. at 858-59. The students sought injunctive and declaratory relief alleging violation of their federal and state constitutional rights. The action was brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute. . . of any State. . . subjects
• . . any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See also Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978) (local governing bodies can be sued directly under § 1983).
30. Pico v. Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
31. Id. at 398.
32. Id. at 394-97. The district court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), Right to Read Defense Comm.
v. School Comm.. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), and Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469
F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979) and instead found Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community
School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), controlling.
In PresidentsCouncil, the Second Circuit upheld a school board's resolution to restrict
student access to a library book. 457 F.2d at 291. In reaching this decision the circuit court
relied on Epperson v. Arkansas, wherein the Supreme Court held that "'[c]ourts do not and
cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."' Id.
(quoting 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). Although the district court in Pico noted that the school
district's decision reflected a misguided educational philosophy, it similarly held that because "[t]he challenged action. . . did not sharply and directly implicate basic first amendment values" the policies established by the school board should not be overruled. 474 F.
Supp. 387, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
33. 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. Id. at 414.
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amendment violation.35 The court recognized, however, that "an unusual and irregular intervention in the school libraries' operations by

persons not routinely concerned with such matters" establishes a
prima facie constitutional violation warranting judicial intervention.3 6

The court explained that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie viola-

tion,37 the burden of persuasion shifts to defendant school officials 38 to
demonstrate a reasonable basis for interference with students' first
amendment rights. 39 Furthermore, even when officials are able to meet
this burden, the court noted that plaintiffs are to be afforded the oppor-

tunity to rebut on the grounds that the school officials' justifications

"'were simply pretexts for the suppression of free speech."4 0 The court
further explained that the true motives underlying removal of books by
35. Id. In Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1980), a companion case heard by the same panel on the same day as Pico, the court
found no first amendment violation in the removal of "vulgar" and "indecent" books, reaffirming the rule that such materials are not constitutionally protected. Id. at 441.
36. 638 F.2d at 414-15. Unlike Judge Sifton, who authored the opinion, the remaining
panel members did not find sufficient evidence upon which they could properly determine
whether the plaintiffs had established a prima facie violation, and the case was therefore
remanded for trial.
37. The Second Circuit recognized, but distinguished certain limited circumstances
when a Board's "irregular and apparently arbitrary intervention" in school affairs would be
tolerated. Id. at 415. These situations included school board regulation of (1) speech which
"'materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others,'" id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969)); (2) language which may affect the "psychological well being of the young," 638
F.2d at 415 (citing Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 925 (1978)); and (3) indecent language which would serve to undermine the Board's
responsibility "'to promote standards of civility and decency among school children.'" 638
F.2d at 415 (quoting Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980)).
38. The Second Circuit further explained that the school board's burden is not met by
bare allegations that these circumstances existed. 638 F.2d at 415. School authorities must
demonstrate that the manner in which the regulation was carried out complies with the test
set out in James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972), and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See infra note 39. See also
Comment,A DefinitionalApproachto Secondary SchoolStudents Right to Know, 42 0H10 ST.
L.J. 1025, 1026-27 (1981).
39. 638 F.2d at 415. The court noted that the educators' burden is not a light one and set
forth a two-prong test: (1) is the Board's policy justified on the grounds that the interests of
discipline or sound education were materially and substantially jeopardized, id. (citing
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972)), and
(2) does the policy constitute the least discriminatory alternative so as to advance the social
interests that justify it without restricting protected speech to an extent greater than is essential to the furtherance of the interests. Id. at 415 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968)).
40. 638 F.2d at 417.
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school officials should be scrutinized lest the stated justification be used
to mask an impermissible purpose:
Where. . . evidence that the decisions made were based on
defendants' moral or political beliefs appears together with
evidence of procedural and substantive irregularities sufficient
to suggest an unwillingness on the part of school officials to
subject their political and personal judgments to the same sort
of scrutiny as that accorded other decisions relating to the education of their charges, an inference emerges that political
views and personal taste are being asserted not in the interests
of the children's well-being, but rather for the purpose of establishing those views as the correct and orthodox ones for all
purposes in the particular community."
The court then enumerated the irregularities present in Pico that
supported an inference that the Board's decision was based on unconstitutional motives rather than the welfare and education of district students.4 2 In its attempt to determine the Board's motives, the Second
Circuit adopted the approach set out in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation.4 ' There, the United
States Supreme Court reviewed the claim that a rezoning decision was
motivated by discriminatory intent. The Court examined the historical
background of the village board's decision, the specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision, and departures from the
normal procedural sequence. 4 In Pico, the Second Circuit focused on
the latter factor. The court found substantive departures from usual
book removal procedures and policy which it considered highly probative of discriminatory motive, particularly because the factors usually
considered by the Board would have strongly favored a decision con41. Id.
42. These irregularities included:
[1] defendants' substantive confusion, not to say incoherence, as to the reasons the
books were being removed from the libraries; [2] the informal and dilatory manner
in which the matter was pursued, including the lapse of three months from the time
the presence of the offending books was discovered in the libraries until the principals of the schools were asked to take some action to prevent children from reading
them. . . ; [3] the expostfacto appointment of a committee to review the removal
of the books, the determinations of which were then, without explanation, not followed by the Board; [4] the strong opposition of professional personnel, including
the District Superintendent, to the procedures used by the Board. . . ; and finally,
[5] the "substantive" irregularities. . . of removing works by such generally recognized authors as Swift, the late Richard Wright, and Bernard Malamud.
Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted).
43. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
44. Id. at 267-68.
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trary to that reached. a5
Troubled by the effect of these irregularities 46 and by the fact that
the district court's grant of summary judgment deprived plaintiffs of
their opportunity to argue the authenticity of the defendants' motives, 7
the Second Circuit remanded for trial on the merits.4a
III.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S REASONING

A.

The Plurality Opinion

In upholding the Second Circuit's decision, a plurality of the
United States Supreme Court recognized for the first time that the first
amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech4 9 limits the discretion of
public school officials to remove library books considered offensive.5
At the outset, Justice Brennan acknowledged that "courts should not
'intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operations of school systems' unless 'basic constitutional values' are 'directly
and sharply implicate[d].' "I, He found, however, that the actions of
school officials in this instance justified such intervention. Although
Justice Brennan agreed that school officials are authorized to "'establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community
values,' "52 he reaffirmed that this authority "must be exercised in a
manner that comports with the. . . First Amendment."53
45. 638 F.2d at 417.
46. Id. at 416. The court described the Board's behavior as "erratic, arbitrary and freewheeling." Id. The court noted that once a board proceeds in this fashion it is "a matter of
guesswork for teachers, librarians and students in the District whether other efforts at selfexpression on their part will be curtailed with equally little notice." Id. at 416-17.
47. Id. at 418.
48. Id. at 419.
49. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. 457 U.S. at 869. The Court began its analysis by noting the limited nature of the
issues involved in the case. The facts as presented, did not require the Court to address the
well established rules governing school curriculum. Id. at 861 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (prohibition against teaching evolution in state school unconstitutional);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (prohibition against teaching modern foreign language unconstitutional)). At issue was the constitutionality of the Board's decision to physically remove library books, which are by their very nature optional rather than required
reading material. 457 U.S. at 862. The procedural posture of the case further limited the
questions presented. When reviewing a reversed order for summary judgment, a court must
draw any factual inferences "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
51. 457 U.S. at 866 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
52. Id. at 864 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10).
53. 457 U.S. at 864. Justice Brennan reaffirmed that "'First Amendment rights, applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to . . . stu-
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Justice Brennan reiterated the Court's previous recognition of the
right to receive information characterizing it as an inherent corollary of
the first amendment right to free speech. 4 Relying on Lamont v. Postmaster General55 and its progeny,5 6 Justice Brennan first addressed the
sender's right to transmit ideas. He explained that the "right to receive
ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment right to
send them, '57 reasoning that it is meaningless to protect the transmission of information if its receipt is proscribed. 8 Secondly, Justice
Brennan reasoned that the "right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recpient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press, and political freedom. ' 59 Relying on these two theories, the plurality extended the previously recognized right to receive information
to school children.
Justice Brennan distinguished between the school board's claim of
absolute discretion in matters of curriculum and its power within the
unique boundaries of the school library.6 0 He found the Board's reliance upon its duty to inculcate community values misplaced when it
attempted to extend its claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom and into the school library where
students are free to select reading materials. 6 1 According to Justice
Brennan, the special characteristics of the school library make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of the right to receive information and ideas. 62 However, because only library book
removal was involved in Pico, he repeatedly cautioned that the decision would not affect the acquisition of books for libraries, classrooms,
63
or compulsory reading liStS.
dents."' Id. at 866 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
54. 457 U.S. at 866. The Court had recognized this right in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) where it ruled that "the State may not, consistently with the spirit of
the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge."
55. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 136-48.
57. 457 U.S. at 867 (emphasis in original). The Court cited numerous cases in support of
this proposition, illustrating the development of the right to receive information. See infra
note 138.
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 868-69.
61. Id. at 869. Board members had argued "that they must be allowed unfettered discretion to 'transmit community values' through the Island Trees schools." Id. (emphasis in
original).
62. Id. at 868-69.
63. Id. at 861-62, 871-72.
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Justice Brennan explained that an inquiry into the motivations be-

hind the Board's action was necessary to determine whether the
Board's removal of library books denied students their first amendment

rights. 64 Unconstitutional motivation would be demonstrated if the decisive factor for book removal was the Board's intent to deny access to
the ideas contained therein.

5

Conversely, the first amendment rights

of the students would not be violated if it were shown that the Board
had decided to remove the books because they were either "pervasively
vulgar" or "educationally unsuitable. 6 6
After examining the students' allegations, 67 Board members' affi69
davits, 68 and other evidentiary material presented to the district court,

the plurality labeled the Board's motivations suspect. The plurality
thus concluded that because there was a material issue of fact as to

whether the Board had exceeded its discretion in removing the books
from the libraries, summary judgment was improper.7"
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to

express his differing characterization of the first amendment right at
issue in Pico. He declined to recognize the right to receive ideas identi-

finding the right at stake to be "narrower and
fied by the plurality,
71

more basic.
"[Ilf schools may be used to inculcate ideas, surely libraries may
play a role in that process. . . . [Conversely,] the State may not act to
64. Id. at 870-71.
65. Id. at 871. Both parties conceded that if a book "removal decision was based solely
upon the 'educational suitability' of the books in question," then unconstitutional motivation would not be demonstrated. Id (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 53).
66. Id.
67. The students alleged that in making its removal decision the Board wrongfully ignored the advice of literary experts, the superintendent of schools, and district librarians and
teachers. They further argued that the Board based its book removal decision, at least in
part, on its belief that the books were "anti-American." Id. at 872, 874.
68. Id. at 873 n.25. These affidavits supported the students' allegations. For example,
the deposition of one board member stated in part: "I believe it is anti-American to present
one of the nation's heroes, the first President, . . . in such a negative and obviously onesided life." Id. (quoting Deposition of Petitioner Martin at 22).
69. Other factors on which the Court relied included the Board's unexplained rejection
of the book committee's recommendations; the fact that the Board's obscenity rationale for
removal was unsupported in the removal of at least one of the books in question; and the
refusal to follow established procedures for review of controversial materials. Id at 873-75.
70. Id. at 875.
71. Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Consequently, Justice Blackmun did not join
in Part IIA(l) of the plurality opinion in which the right to receive information was identified as the source of the plaintiff's constitutional protection. Id. at 882.
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deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that
idea for partisan or political reasons. ' 72 Moreover, although Justice
Blackmun recognized that a school board has the authority to limit students' rights when they interfere with the daily operation of the school
or the safety of others, he did not understand how a library book could
73
be viewed as such an intrusion.
Justice Blackmun further observed that while the right as defined
by the plurality may well impose an affirmative duty upon the state to
provide students with information or ideas, his definition required no
such obligation.74 He also expressed doubt that there was a "theoretical distinction between removal of a book and failure to acquire a
book," but found the distinction useful in that book removal was more
likely to evidence improper motivation. 75 Thus, Justice Blackmun
agreed with the plurality that the Board should be required to demonstrate a proper motivation for its removal decision7 6 and accepted the
standard set forth to guide the proceedings on remand.7 7
Justice White also concurred in the judgment, 78 but expressed
agreement with the plurality only to the extent that it affirmed the Second Circuit's determination that summary judgment was an inappropriate resolution of the issue. 79 He declined to evaluate and decide any
constitutional issues raised by the case.80 In addition, he adopted none
of the plurality's first amendment analysis and opted merely to remand
the case to the district court for reconsideration and amplification of
the record.8 '
C

The Dissenting Opinions

Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
72. Id. at 878-79 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 878 n.l.
74. Id. at 878.
75. Id. at 878-79 n.1.
76. Id. at 880.
77. Id. at 882.
78. Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
79. Id. "I am not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals on such a fact-bound
issue and hence concur in the judgment of affirmance." Id.
80. "The Court seems compelled to go furiher and issue a dissertation on the extent to
which the First Amendment limits the discretion of the school board to remove books from
the school library. I see no necessity for doing so at this point." Id. Chief Justice Burger
evidenced a similar view: "'the most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is
not to face constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all possible."' Id. at 886 n.2
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
81. 457 U.S. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring).
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O'Connor, dissented, arguing that the plurality opinion "demeans [the
Court's] function of constitutional adjudication." 2 The opinion, in his
view, improperly subjected the decisions of school authorities "concerning what books are to be in the school library. . . to federal-court
review." 3 He stated that were this notion of judicial intervention recognized as law, "this Court would come perilously close to becoming a
'super censor' of school board library decisions."8 4
The Chief Justice rejected the plurality's recognition of a student's
right of access to particular library books. Citing Rowan v. Post Office
Department,85 he asserted that a sender's rights are not absolute. He
pointed out that the Court has never indicated that the government has
an obligation to aid a speaker or author in reaching an audience.8 6
Chief Justice Burger further reasoned that because the books which the
Board removed were available in public libraries and neighborhood
book stores, the Board's book removal decision did not constitute a
deprivation of constitutional dimensions.8 7 Although the Chief Justice
argued that judicial intervention was improper under the instant facts,
he suggested the availability of other remedies, including the removal
88
of Board members from office.
Chief Justice Burger also criticized the plurality's distinction between book removal and acquisition, arguing that an accident of timing
should not be the basis of a constitutional entitlement. He further
noted that if, as the plurality stated, book removal could constitute im82. Id. at 893 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 885.
84. Id.
85. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Chief Justice Burger's reliance on Rowan seems misplaced.
There the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute which provided a procedure
through which a homeowner could prevent delivery of "'matter which the addressee believe[d] to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.'" Id. at 730 (quoting 39 U.S.C.
§ 4009(a) (Supp. IV 1964)). Although Rowan does restrict the sender's right to distribute
material, its factual setting and emphasis on the autonomy of the individual distinguishes it
from Pico.
Conversely, the constitutionality of 39 U.S.C. § 4009(g), which permits parent addressees to block the receipt of "offensive" material by their minor children but which was not
addressed by the Rowan Court, was questioned by Justices Brennan and Douglas. 397 U.S.
at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, Rowan offers no precedential support for the proposition that a school board acting in place of the parent may restrict student access to materials deemed offensive.
86. 457 U.S. at 888 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice asserted that "the 'right
to receive information and ideas' . . . does not carry with it the concomitant right to have
those ideas affirmatively provided at a particular place by the government." Id. (quoting
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
87. Id. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 891.
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proper suppression of ideas, "[slimilarly, a decision to eliminate certain
material from the curriculum . . .would carry an equal-probably
greater-prospect of 'official suppression.' "9
Justice Powell expressed "genuine dismay" with the plurality's
opinion,90 which he described as a "debilitating encroachment upon
the institutions of a free people."'" He predicted that the use of the
courts to resolve educational policy decisions would "corrode the
school board's authority and effectiveness." 92 Justice Powell contended
that "the decision as to the educational worth of a book is a highly
subjective one. Judges rarely are as competent as school authorities to
make this decision; nor are judges responsive to the parents and people
of the school district."9 3 He characterized a decision to remove school
library books as an educational decision which should thus be made by
the duly constituted board.9 4
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, found error in every aspect of the plurality opinion. Unlike Justice
White,9 5 Justice Rehnquist deemed it proper to consider the constitutional issues; he reasoned that once certiorari is granted a case must be
decided on the merits. 96 He contended, however, that under the district
court's summary judgment procedure the respondents' statement of
facts should have established the limits of the Court's constitutional
analysis. 97 Therefore he took exception to the plurality's reliance on
other evidentiary material in an effort to create a more favorable version of the facts. 98 After reviewing the facts as framed by the respondents' motion in opposition to summary judgment, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the Board did not "run afoul of the First and Four89. Id. at 892-93.
90. Id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting). That Justice Powell once held the position of
school board president in Richmond, Virginia may explain the tone of his dissent. Greenhouse, High Court Limits Banning of Books, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1982, at 10, col. 3.
91. 457 U.S. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 894.
93. Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 897.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
96. 457 U.S. at 904-05 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 905.
98. Id. at 905-06. Justice Rehnquist relied on rule 9(g) of the local rules of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which requires parties to submit
a statement of material facts in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion.
All uncontroverted facts would be deemed admitted. E.D.N.Y. Rule 9(g). Justice Rehnquist argued that because respondents had "essentially conceded" that some of the materials
were obscene or offensive, the Court was precluded from finding otherwise. Id. at 906 & n.4.
See also supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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teenth Amendments."9 9 He sought to resolve the constitutional question by distinguishing the roles of state government as educator and as
sovereign. °° When the government acts as educator, he reasoned, it "is
engaged in inculcating social values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people." 10
' Therefore, "actions by the government
as educator do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions
'
by the government as sovereign.
Justice Rehnquist further argued that there was no supporting precedent for the right to receive information and ideas within the educational environment. He criticized the plurality's reliance on past
0 3
decisions which recognized this right within other limited settings.1
Although Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the right to receive
ideas is the reciprocal to the right of free speech," he contended that
"the denial of access to ideas inhibits one's own acquisition of knowledge only when that denial is relatively complete."'0 5 This was not the
case here, he explained, where "the removed books are readily available to students and nonstudents alike at the comer bookstore or the
public library."' 1 6
Justice Rehnquist also characterized the plurality opinion as analytically unsound and internally inconsistent.107 He noted that by confining the right to receive ideas to a library setting, the plurality
"provid[ed] no protection against a school board's decision not to acquire a particular book, even though that decision denies access to
ideas as fully as does removal of the book from the library."'0 8 Furthermore, because the plurality narrowly framed the issue in terms of
the authority of school officials to remove a book, the failure to acquire
a library book, while causing the same infringement, would remain
constitutionally unguarded. 9 Finally, he questioned the validity of
"102

99. 457 U.S. at 908.
100. Id. at 909.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 910 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 911. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "the Court has recognized a limited
version of that right in other settings," but noted that "not one of these cases concerned or
even purported to discuss elementary or secondary educational institutions." Id. at 911. Justice Rehnquist took particular issue with the plurality's recognition of a school child's right
to receive ideas, observing that Tinker concerned only the rights of students to "freedom of
speech and expression, not the right of access to particular ideas." Id.
104. Id. at 912.
105. Id. at 913.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 915.
108. Id. at 910.
109. Id. at 916.
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the plurality's motive requirement which holds that it is only when
school officials intend to deny student access to ideas that their actions
may be found unconstitutional.' 10 Rather, he reasoned that a book re-

moval decision can deny a student access to certain ideas regardless of
the motive underlying the decision."1 '
IV.

JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO SCHOOL OFFICIALS' ACTIONS:
SCOPE OF REVIEW

A.

HistoricalBackground

Boardof Education,IslandTrees Union FreeSchool DistrictNo. 26
v. Pico 112 represents a pronounced change in the Supreme Court's attitude toward the traditional standard of deference afforded educators.
The reluctance of courts to intervene in the daily operations of school
systems has stemmed, in part, from the broad discretion vested in local
boards to formulate educational policy." 3 Judicial review of educational decisions was historically rare, 14 and exceptions were mostly
confined to attacks on the curriculum based upon alleged violations of
the first amendment's freedom of religion and establishment clauses." 5
The fact that education was traditionally viewed as a parental obligation supported the view that educational decisions were more properly made by local governing bodies." 6 The indoctrinative function of
110. Id. at 917.
I11. Id.
112. 457 U.S. 853.
113. The large majority of state legislatures has delegated extensive educational decisionmaking authority to local school boards. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-341 - 15343 (Supp. 1983); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 1000-1082 (West 1978 & Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT.
§§ 230.03, 230.23 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 §§ 10-22.1 - 10-22.34
(Smith-Hurd 1961 & Supp. 1983-84); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, §§ 37-37K (West 1982
& Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.561-.641 (West 1976); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 1709 (McKinney 1972).
114. See Bishop v. Inhabitants of Rowley, 165 Mass. 460, 462, 43 N.E. 191, 191 (1896)
(good faith acts by school officials cannot be judicially revised); Watson v. Cambridge, 157
Mass. 561, 563, 32 N.E. 864, 864-65 (1893) (school board decisions which involve internal
educational affairs will not be adjudicated).
115. See generally Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) ("the State may not adopt
programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which 'aid or oppose' any religion");
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state law requiring forcible recitation of official prayer
in public schools inconsistent with establishment clause); Nahmod, FirstAmendment Protectionfor Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1479
(1972).
116. One doctrine, termed in loco parentis ("in place of the parent") and often cited in
support of judicial deference to school board decisions, provides for the school official to
step into the parents' shoes while the child is in school. The rationale behind the doctrine is
historically based. Parents, by voluntarily sending their children to school, were thought to
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public schools further justified the local school board's decision-making authority.' 17 Parents believed that the principal role of public

schools was to establish and apply the curriculum in such a way as to
transmit community values."

8

The library, in particular, was viewed

as an appropriate forum in which local authorities could reinforce community ideologies, attitudes, or standards." 9 Additionally, courts were
reluctant to intervene in school controversies because the school

board's expertise in educational matters was viewed as superior to that
of the judiciary.'2
B.

Modern Developments

Although the Constitution indirectly reserves power over educa-

tion to the states, the same document restrains censorship, particularly
through application of the first and fourteenth amendments.

More-

over, this constitutional restriction applies to the schools: "[I]t is beyond dispute that.

. .

school boards must operate within the confines

of the First Amendment."' 12 1 As one commentator noted, "[a]ssuring
good education is not a function of the courts. Assuring that public

school education operates within constitutional bounds is a function of
have delegated disciplinary authority over their children to the school official. Following
the institution of compulsory education, however, the doctrine was severely weakened.
Presently, court decisions, state statutes, and school district policies have eliminated or severely limited its application. See Comment, Not on Our Shelves: A FirstAmendment Analysis of Library Censorshipin the PublicSchools, 61 NEB. L. REV. 98, 100 (1982); Comment,
What Will We Tell the Children? A Discussion of Current Judicial Opinion on the Scope of
IdeasAcceptablefor Presentationin PrimaryandSecondary Education, 56 TUL. L. REV. 960,
962-64 (1982); Comment, School Library Censorship: First Amendment Guaranteesand the
Student's Right to Know, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 523, 524-26 (1980); Goldstein, The Scope and
Sources of School BoardAuthority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 377-84 (1969).
117. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. See Project, supra note 3, at 1375-80.
119. See, e.g., Project, supra note 3, at 1486-89; O'Neil, Libraries, Librariansand First
Amendment Freedoms, 4 HuM. RTs. 295 (1975).
120. Nevertheless, although local boards are characteristically composed of civically responsible citizens, such persons often have no particular training in educational administration. Most state laws require only limited qualifications for membership on the board of
education such as age, local residence, citizenship, and literacy. Stallings, supra note 3, at
286. Thus, it could be argued that deference has often been afforded members of school
boards who may be no more competent than the judiciary to make educational policy. Certainly, when first amendment rights are implicated, a judge would be expected to be the
more sensitive, and thus the more appropriate arbiter of constitutional standards. See Project, supra note 3, at 1486; Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1048, 1050 (1968).
121. Pico, 457 U.S. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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22
the courts."' 1

Recognition of the first amendment rights of students has resulted
in a departure from the prior policy of judicial deference afforded

school officials.'

23

The Supreme Court's landmark decision, Tinker v.

Des Moines Independent Community School District,124 signaled an
awareness of the need for a heightened standard of review when local
educational decisions implicate first amendment values. The Tinker
Court addressed the right of high school students to wear black arm
bands in protest of the Vietnam War. 2 5 The Court held that students
retain some constitutional rights which the state may not suppress with-

out inviting judicial intervention

26 and

stated that unless such expres-

sion substantially interferes with school activities, it cannot be

prohibited by school authorities. 2 7 The majority thus recognized that
even where first amendment intrujudicial intervention is imperative
minor. 28

sion is relatively

Nonetheless, the authority of a school board to interpret its own
rules or guidelines is usually unquestioned.' 9 When a complaint pertains solely to matters within the administrative expertise of the educational officials involved, it is not even considered judicially

cognizable. 3 ' Consequently, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held it
improper for the federal judiciary to overrule the decisions of school

administrators solely on the basis that such actions are unwise or incompassionate. '3'

The federal circuit courts have also cautioned

against overturning board decisions unless a specific constitutional
122. Reutter, Censorsh4 in Public Schools, in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION 1,
9 (M. McGhehey ed. 1977).
123. See generally Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir.
1976); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
One explanation offered for the increasing adjudication of school controversies, see supra
note 8, is the change in educational theory and practice. Current studies indicate that instead of focusing on order and indoctrination, schools are advocating a more progressive
approach which stresses greater student inquiry and exposure to a variety of ideas. See
Nahmod, supra note 115, at 1480-81.
124. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
125. Id. at 504.
126. Id. at 511.
127. Id. at 514.
128. See id. at 513-14.
129. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (D.N.H.
1979).
130. Muka v. Cornell, 48 A.D.2d 944, 946, 368 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
131. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (inappropriate to set aside
administrative decision to remove books even though decision viewed as lacking basis in
wisdom and compassion).
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right is violated.' 32
When constitutional issues are involved, however, the "customary
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is inappropriate,"' 133 and courts will strictly scrutinize the decision of school
administrators. Thus, by recognizing a student's first amendment right
to receive information, the Pico Court heightened the standard of review applied to school board book removal action. Specifically, when
first amendment values are implicated, local officials must demonstrate
that such action was compelled by some substantial and legitimate gov34
ernment interest.1
V.

SOURCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT:

THE RIGHT TO

RECEIVE IDEAS

In Boardof Education,IslandTrees Union FreeSchool DistrictNo.
26 v. Pico, 13 student litigants argued that the first amendment barred
the removal of books from district libraries. A careful reading of the
fragmented ruling in Pico indicates that the first amendment may be
invoked to bar the censorship of library materials under limited
circumstances.
A. Recognition of the Right
Although it was well established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District'3 6 that students do not "shed their con' 37
stitutional rights to freedom of speech. . . at the schoolhouse gate," 1

prior to Pico, the constitutional contours of the student's right to receive information and ideas remained rudimentary.

38

No Supreme

132. See, e.g., East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 857 (2d Cir.
1977) (en banc); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289, 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
133. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (D.N.H. 1979).
134. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1979). "Censorship or suppression of expression of opinion ... should be tolerated only where there is a legitimate interest of the state which can be said to require priority." Id. See generally Salvail v. Nashua
Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v.
School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 713 (D. Mass. 1978).
135. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
136. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
137. Id. at 506.
138. Prior to the instant case, at least five federal courts had considered first amendment
challenges to the removal of books from school libraries. Three courts found such action to
be unconstitutional, therefore recognizing a student's right to receive ideas. See Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d-577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ.,
469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F.
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). Conversely, the Second Circuit held that such removal did not
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Court decision had recognized the right of public school students to
receive educational information. The Court had, however, acknowledged the existence of the right to receive ideas in other contexts.
The first clear reference to this right appeared in Lamont v. Postmaster General.'39 The Lamont Court held unconstitutional a statute
that required the postal service to detain delivery of material advocating communism on the ground that it infringed the first amendment
rights of addressees. 40 The Court's focus, therefore, was on the addressees' right to receive such publications. Although the majority
opinion did not fully explore the nature of the underlying constitutional interest, Justice Brennan's concurrence set forth the constitutional parameters of the right to receive ideas:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific
guarantee of access to publications. However, the protection
of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to
protect from congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful. . . . I think the right to receive
publications is such a fundamental right. 4 '
42
Four years after Lamont, the Court held in Stanley v. Georgia1
that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas
regardless of their social worth.' 43 Subsequently, in Kleindienst v.
Mandel,'" the issue raised was whether the first amendment grants a
domestic audience the right to invite foreign speakers to the United
States. While basing its decision on other grounds, the Mandel Court
acknowledged that freedom of speech necessarily protects the citizens'
45
right to receive information and ideas.'
violate the first amendment. See Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No.
25, 457 F.2d 289, 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). See supra note 32. In a
recent Seventh Circuit case, that court found no constitutional violation resulting from library book removal, but nevertheless recognized that secondary students do retain a "freedom to hear" interest. See Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304
(7th Cir. 1980).
139. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
140. Id. at 305.
141. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
142. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
143. Id. at 564.
144. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
145. Id. at 762-65. While a majority of the Mandel Court acknowledged a U.S. citizen's
first amendment right to hear an alien speak and the dissenters strengthened the constitutional basis for a right to receive information, Mandel does not directly support recognition
of the right addressed in Pico because of the distinction between written and oral communication. One commentator has suggested that because written words can be preserved, inter-
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Not until 1975 did a majority of the Court recognize the existence
of the right to receive information. In Procunier v. Martinez, 46 the
Court held that an individual has the right to receive uncensored mail
from a prisoner.147 Justice Marshall noted in his concurrence that were
the Court to sustain a policy which serves to withhold information
from the public it would be "at odds with the most basic tenets of the
guarantee of freedom of speech."' 148 Nonetheless, the recipient's right
to assert a cause of action based on a violation of this right was doubtful prior to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council,Inc. 149
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, potential consumers challenged on first amendment grounds a statute that imposed fines on
pharmacists who advertised prescription drug prices.' 50 One of the issues the Court addressed was whether the potential recipients of drug
price information had standing to assert a constitutional violation. Significantly, the Court relied on Lamont and its progeny in holding that
the first amendment affords protection not only to the communication
or its source, but to recipients as well.' 5'
B. Expansion of the Right
VirginiaState Boardof Pharmacy provided student litigants with a
useful analogy. Arguably, the information contained within a library
text should likewise be afforded first amendment protection which
could be properly asserted by the potential student recipients of the
book's contents. At least two federal courts adopted this reasoning, and
extended first amendment protection to secondary students affected by
library book censorship.
The Sixth Circuit, in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District,"5' 2 considered whether the school board's removal of two library
books impinged on the students' right to receive information. Relying
ference with their receipt is less onerous than denial of a speaker's access to an audience.
Arguably then, "there may be a more compelling constitutional case for the claim of an
audience to hear a speaker than for a reader to receive printed material." O'Neil, Libraries,
Libertiesand the FirstAmendment, 42 U. Cn. L. REv. 209, 228 (1973).
146. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
147. Id. at 408. "Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence
with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech." Id.
148. Id. at 427 (Marshall, J., concurring).
149. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
150. Id. at 749-50.
151. Id. at 756.
152. 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
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principally on VirginiaState BoardofPharmacy, the court held that the
first amendment right to receive information was applicable within the
school setting and that students had standing to assert this right.153
More recently, in Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education,'5 4 a New
Hampshire district court rejected Second Circuit precedent,155 reasoning that the Court's analysis in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was
56
controlling'
It was well established in Tinker, however, that a student's first
amendment rights are limited to some extent by the special nature of a
school environment. 57 Therefore, although Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy may have supplied student litigants with standing to challenge school library book removal decisions, it left unresolved the extent to which the judiciary should intervene in public school affairs.
C. Pico's Application of the Right
While the basis for a constitutional right to receive information
seems logically compelling, it is not squarely embedded in constitutional law. In his attempt to acknowledge this "student right to receive," Justice Brennan combined the principles set out in Tinker with
58
those cases which recognized the right to receive in other contexts.
Admittedly, although Tinker concerned freedom of speech and expression the Court did not directly address the students' constitutional right
to receive ideas in that case.' 5 9 Rather, the Tinker Court considered
whether high school students have the right to exercise symbolic speech
within school grounds. Tinker addressed the active right to deliver
speech while Pico involved the passive right to receive it.' 60 Tinker,
therefore, when read narrowly, does not support the extension to stu6
dents of the first amendment right to receive ideas.' '
153. Id. at 583.
154. 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
155. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). The Salvail court noted that because Presidents
Council was decided prior to the Court's decision in Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, its
precedential value is severely limited. 469 F. Supp. at 1273-74.
156. 469 F. Supp. at 1273-74.
157. 393 U.S. at 506.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 139-48.
159. Pico, 457 U.S. at 910-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 886-87 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
160. See supra note 145.
161. For an exhaustive review of Tinker and its ramifications see Diamond, The First
Amendment and PublicSchools: The CaseAgainst JudicialIntervention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477
(1981).
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The plurality's reliance on the right to receive case law is also open

to criticism. As Chief Justice Burger noted, the mere fact that a writer
has something to say does not require that school officials carry that
message to students.' 62 Practically speaking, this right, as Justice Brennan defines it, does appear to impose an affirmative duty upon school
officials to shelve any requested book unless they can show a compelling reason why they should not do so. Although the line of cases beginning with Lamont may provide the Court with useful analogies for a

students' right to receive information, as the Chief Justice argued their
precedential value may be limited in this context. One commentator
explains that "[wihat the Lamont Court recognized was not an absolute
right of access, but rather a right not to have access conditioned upon a
politically hazardous disclosure."' 63 In other words, no affirmative right
to receive personal mail is vested in the addressee. Rather, the Lamont
Court held that Congress could not condition or impose unreasonable
restraints on the receipt of suspect mail.

Justice Rehnquist also took issue with the plurality's reliance on
the right to receive case law. He argued that none of these decisions
directly controlled the instant case because they concerned a complete
denial of access to the ideas sought.' The Chief Justice's suggestion

that students may gain access to books banned from school libraries in
book stores or public libraries is, however, unpersuasive. 65 The
Mandel Court labeled as loathsome the notion that the existence of
other alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest.' 66
162. 457 U.S. at 887 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
163. See O'Neil, supra note 145, at 219.
164. 457 U.S. at 912-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes
136-48.
165. See infra note 168. Chief Justice Burger further suggested that when "parents disagree with the educational decisions of the school board, they can take steps to remove the
board members from office." 457 U.S. at 891 (Burger, C.J. dissenting). The ineffectiveness
of such a solution, however, is readily apparent. Protection of students' first amendment
rights would be virtually nonexistent were courts to defer this controversy to the electoral
process. West Virginia State Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942). For example, if a school board eliminated books that supported a view held by the minority of the
community, in order to remove the school board members responsible for this action the
minority group affected would bear the heavy, and possibly impossible, burden of convincing a majority of the voters to support their removal effort. Comment, What Johnny Can't
Read- School Boardsand the FirstAmendment, 42 UNIV. PrTr. L. REV. 653, 665 (1981). In
addition, the complexity of recall laws may frustrate the removal challenge. Often special
requirement provisions are included in a recall statute which add to the difficulty of this
electorate remedy. See 1981 YEARBOOK OF SCHOOL LAW 26.
166. 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). Although the Mandel Court did not need to balance first
amendment rights against governmental regulatory interests, it recognized that alternative
means of access to information may be relevant when such balancing is necessary. Id.
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Moreover, Justice Rehnquist's argument that alternative access to information justifies its restriction 67 was rejected by the Court in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy. There the Court emphasized that it was
"aware of no general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged

when the6 speaker's
listeners could come by [the] message by some other
8
means." 1

Criticism of the plurality's reliance on Tinker is also weakened by
a close reading of that case. Although the factual setting of Tinker is
distinguishable from that ofPico, Tinker does contain authority for the

plurality's ruling that "'the State may not, consistently with the spirit
of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowl-

edge.' ,,169 Tinker recognized that "First Amendment rights, applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to . . . students."' 70 The Pico Court's use of this expansive language, coupled with the right to receive case law, enabled it to extend

first amendment protection to the interests of students in school library
materials.
Nevertheless, a more efficient and constitutionally sound way to

adopt the spirit of Tinker may be found in Justice Blackmun's approach. Instead of focusing on a duty to provide information, as did

Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the educator should
be prevented from restraining certain ideas simply because school offi-

cials find them politically distasteful. 7 ' As did the Lamont Court, Justice Blackmun

stressed that the government

may not impose

167. 425 U.S. at 782-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 757 n.15. See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
In Schad, a case that successfully challenged on first amendment grounds the use of the
state's zoning power to prohibit adult entertainment, Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger, who was joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that as long as there was reasonable access
to the form of entertainment outside the community, total exclusion was permissible. Id. at
80 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
This "alternative access" solution leaves unanswered several troubling questions. How
can a school board ensure that reasonable access to the banned books outside its jurisdiction
will remain? What happens if the community in which the books are located decides to
exclude them? What provision is to be made for students in rural areas with transportation
problems who have no access to the public library or bookstore in the nearest town? Will a
school library book removal action be invalidated under such circumstances?
169. 457 U.S. at 866 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)). Justice
Blackmun similarly noted in his concurrence that even though the state possesses a significant amount of power to inculcate certain values "'state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. . . . In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."' 457 U.S. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511).
170. 393 U.S. at 506.
171. 457 U.S. at 879, 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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unreasonable restraints or conditions upon the receipt of information,
in this case within the school environment. 7 By characterizing the
right in the negative, (what the government cannot do) Justice Blackmun's approach avoids imposition of an affirmative obligation on
school officials to provide information. 73
Moreover, under Justice Blackmun's characterization of the right
to receive, the school official would have more latitude and discretion
to choose one library book over another without fear of violating the
Constitution.'74 Additionally, Justice Blackmun's opinion is internally
consistent. First amendment protection, as he defines it, would be
available regardless of the setting in which it is invoked. The right to
be free from politically motivated censorship would not be somehow
peculiar to the school library or limited to book removal. 175
Still, neither Justices Brennan nor Blackmun provides adequate
guidance as to what constitutes a violation of the student's right to receive. Instead, both Justices focused upon a school board's intent and
motivation in order to test the constitutionality of a book removal
decision.
D. The Test for Determining ConstitutionalViolations
The Pico Court explained that a determination of whether the first
amendment rights of Island Trees students had been violated by the
Board's book removal action depended on the motivation behind the
Board's action.1 76 Although Justice Brennan was criticized for framing
this newly recognized constitutional right in terms "too diaphanous to
assist careful decision,"' 177 he was more explicit in distinguishing between a proper and improper motive for book removal.
The Pico Court delineated a two-prong test: "If [the Board] in172. Id. at 878-80.
173. See supra text accompanying note 74.
174. Justice Blackmun recognized that the authority of school officials to select the contents of school libraries should not be contravened. Examples of school board decisions
cited by Justice Blackmun which would not implicate first amendment values included:
(1) choosing one book over another because it is deemed more relevant to the curriculum or
better written; (2) deciding not to shelve a book because it contains offensive language;
(3) restricting a book because it is found to be "psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age group;" or (4) because it is found to contain ideas which are "manifestly
inimical to the public welfare;" and (5) choosing one book over another because its subject is
more deserving of emphasis according to the school official. 457 U.S. at 880.
175. Id. at 878.
176. Id. at 871.
177. Id. at 919 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); accordid. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 1d.
at 894-95 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tended by [its] removal decision to deny [students] access to ideas with
which [the Board] disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in
[the Board's] decision, then [the Board] has exercised [its] discretion in
violation of the Constitution." 7 8 It is not, as Justice Rehnquist implied
in his dissent, 7 9 unusual or nonproductive for the Court to inquire
about a school board's intent when its actions are challenged. The
Supreme Court recently acknowledged that the motives underlying a
school official's actions may determine the necessity of judicial intervention.'8 ° The difficulty, however, lies in establishing the existence of
a school board's specific unconstitutional motive. Most board actions
concerning a book removal decision typically occur behind closed
doors and thus provide little evidence from which a court may deter8
mine actual motive.1 '
Although not infallible, the Arlington test applied by the Second
Circuit in Pico I 2 enabled that court to look beyond the criteria for
book removal articulated by the Board and discover procedural and
other irregularities which warranted an inference that the welfare and
education of students were not the motivating factors behind the school
board's book removal decision.' 8 3
E. Evidence Indicating UnconstitutionalMotivation
Unlike the circuit court opinion, the Supreme Court opinion did
not enumerate the steps a court should take to identify improper motive. Nonetheless, although it did not expressly refer to the Arlington
test, the Pico plurality did apply the Arlington analysis within its discussion of the propriety of the trial court's grant of summary
84
judgment.
An examination of the evidentiary material presented to the dis178. Id. at 871 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit ruled that a school board's limita-

tion on a student's constitutional rights would be justified if the restriction were made to
protect the interest of discipline or sound education from material and substantial jeopardy.
Pico, 638 F.2d at 415 (citing James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 571 (1972)).
179. 457 U.S. at 917 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
180. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J.). But see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 636-37 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Justice Stevens, while joining the Pico plurality, has expressed dissatisfaction with the application of intent tests in constitutional adjudication). See also The Supreme Court, 1981
Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 107 n.12 & 159 n.52 (1981).
181. Pico serves as a case in point. The Island Trees School Board announced its directive to remove the nine library books in a closed board meeting. 638 F.2d at 409.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
183. 638 F.2d at 417-18.
184. 457 U.S. at 871-75.
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trict court led the plurality to conclude that the Island Trees school
officials' book removal decision was partially the result of an affront to
their personal values, morals, and tastes (constitutionally permissible
motives) and their belief that certain book passages were anti-American (a constitutionally questionable motive).' 8 5 A review of the procedures employed by the Board, however, raised suspicions regarding
these motives. 186 Among the factors on which the Court relied were the
Board's unexplained rejection of the book committee's recommendations; absence of support for the Board's obscenity rationale in the case
of at least one of the books (4 Readerfor Writers, edited by Jerome
Archer); and the Board's refusal to follow established procedures for
review of controversial materials.' 8 7 The Court concluded that "[t]he
evidence plainly [did] not foreclose the possibility that petitioners' decision to remove the books rested decisively upon disagreement with
constitutionally protected ideas in those books, or upon a desire on petitioners' part to impose upon the students of the Island Trees High
School and Junior High School a political orthodoxy to which petitioners and their constituents adhered."' 8 8 After an in depth review of all
the claims, affidavits, and other evidentiary materials, the Court held
that the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact concerning
the credibility of petitioners' justifications for their decisions. 8 9
In criticizing the plurality's independent review of the record, Justice Rehnquist overlooked the possibility that a factual determination
may be crucial to the outcome of a case.' 90 Moreover, the particular
circumstances and facts relevant to a specific case often deprive precedent of its reliability.' 9 1 Indeed, it has been suggested that a federal
court's review of basic and ultimate facts should be as comprehensive
as necessary to protect an asserted first amendment right. 92
185. .Id. at 872.
186. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
187. 457 U.S. at 872-74. Justice Brennan noted that "[t]his would be a very different case
if the record demonstrated that petitioners had employed established, regular, and facially
unbiased procedures for the review of controversial materials." Id. at 874.
188. Id. at 875.
189. Id.
190. He argued that respondents were not entitled to any more favorable version of the
facts than those they had submitted in their motion opposing summary judgment and that
such facts indicated that removal was instituted for proper reasons. Id. at 905-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
640 (1943); Pico, 638 F.2d at 413. See supra note 98.
191. See Nahmod, supra note 115, at 1486.
192. Id. at 1486-87.
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IMPACT

Although the Court's ruling in Pico has been hailed as an important constitutional victory by book publishers and civil liberty lawyers,
the decision is likely to impact less sharply on a school board's discretionary powers than was originally anticipated. A number of observations lead to this conclusion.
First, as Justice Brennan explicitly emphasized, the nature of the
decision is limited. 193 The, holding only affects challenges to the removal of books from the school library. It affects neither the acquisition 194 nor the purchase or retention of curricular materials for use in
the classroom. 9 5 Secondly, the Court noted that an unconstitutional
motivation would not be demonstrated when library books were removed because they were pervasively vulgar or educationally unsuitable. 9 6 In effect, Pico permits school officials to suppress ideas and
information when their decisions rest on proper motivations.
Furthermore, the plurality conceded that this would have been a
very different case had the record demonstrated that the school board
employed an established, regular, and facially unbiased policy for the
review of controversial materials. 197 It may be that educators have
only to employ routine neutral book removal procedures to avoid judicial intervention. Ironically, if such procedural devices are employed
to mask improper motives, the Pico decision may serve as a blueprint
for successful censorship.
Finally, because the right to receive section of Justice Brennan's
opinion was joined only by Justices Marshall and Stevens, a majority
of the Court has yet to recognize and clearly identify this right as constitutionally guaranteed. Notably, Justice White, while concurring in
the judgment, expressed no opinion on the possibility that the school
board's actions might have amounted to a constitutional violation. 9 8
Thus, although a plurality of the Court recognized that the first amendment affords some kind of protection against school library censorship,
were the Court to review a future decision on the merits a majority
might well hold otherwise.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See 457 U.S. at 861-63.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION

In Tinker, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a state cannot
"so conduct its schools as to 'foster a homogeneous people.' "199 If
meaning is to be given this principle, the courts have a responsibility to
review the actions of educators to ensure that they do not violate the
first amendment rights of students. Perhaps the Pico Court is to be
faulted for granting certiorari in the absence of findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the district court. The procedural posture of the
case obviously constrained the Court in its attempt to delineate the first
amendment limitations placed on school officials. In any case, the plurality's recognition of a constitutionally based right to information does
not mean to suggest that simply because one student wishes to read a
particular book, a court can compel school officials to place it in a
school library. It is to say, however, that school authorities who unilaterally remove library books must now bear the burden of showing that
their actions were properly motivated.
Ideally, however, the Court should have set out a standard to provide guidance to both educators and the judiciary in order to prevent
future controversy and encourage educational decisions which comport
with the Constitution. "'The danger of [a] chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform . . . what is being proscribed.' ,20
Unfortunately, the plurality failed to define with sufficient clarity the
constitutional contours of the right at issue in Pico. Thus, the fragmented nature of the decision leaves clarification of the precise contours of that right to another day.
Michele D. Levine

199. 393 U.S. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
200. 638 F.2d at 416 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04
(1967)).

